# MinerOps Windows Agent

The Windows Agent runs at a mining site and performs local discovery, polling,
API3 enrichment, pool polling, and approved queued miner-control operations.
MinerOps does not send API3 credentials through the hub command queue; those
credentials remain in the Agent's local `agent-config.json`.

## Recovered Baseline

The seven runtime and support scripts in this directory were recovered from the
live `C:\MinerOpsAgent` installation. `BASELINE_SHA256SUMS` records their exact
pre-change hashes. Historical backups, live configuration, state, logs, and
probe output are intentionally excluded.

## Local Files

Create `agent-config.json` from `config.example.json` on the Agent host. Never
commit that file. `site_id` is the durable MinerOps site UUID. `agent_zone_id` is the optional
durable network-reachability Zone UUID; older configurations may omit it only
when the Hub can preserve an established assignment or resolve exactly one
enabled Zone at the Site. `site_name` is retained only for transitional display
compatibility.

The Agent writes runtime state to `agent-state.json` and logs under `logs/`.
Installation and upgrades preserve all three paths.

## Security

API3 account and password values are local secrets. Missing credentials make
miner control unavailable. Passwords, API tokens, salts, and the Agent secret
must not be written to normal logs or returned to MinerOps command history.

New Agent identities use per-Agent credentials created through secure
one-time enrollment. The permanent Agent secret is returned only to the
enrolling Agent and is stored locally in `agent-config.json`; MinerOps stores
only its hash. The legacy deployment shared secret remains only for explicitly
retained compatibility behavior and must not authenticate a newly enrolled
per-Agent identity.

## Legacy Compatibility

The older direct Hub API3, `/agent-control`, password-change, bulk-control, and
scheduling paths remain available for compatibility and are deprecated for the
Internal Alpha. The new Miner Detail controls use only the typed control API and
Agent queue; the modular control backend does not connect directly to miners.

## Deployment

### New Agent enrollment

For a new Agent, use Agent Management in MinerOps:

1. Choose the Site and an enabled, unassigned Agent Zone.
2. Enter a descriptive Agent name.
3. Create a Windows enrollment.
4. Download MinerOpsAgent-Windows.zip before the enrollment expires.
5. Copy the ZIP to the intended Windows machine and extract it.
6. Open Windows PowerShell as Administrator in the extracted
   MinerOpsAgent-Windows directory.
7. Run:

       .\Enroll-MinerOpsAgent.ps1

8. Enter the local WhatsMiner API3 account/password when prompted, or leave
   the account blank if API3 functionality is not being configured yet.
9. The bootstrapper exchanges the short-lived token with POST /api/agent/enroll,
   saves the resulting permanent Agent identity locally, and hands off to the
   safe runtime installer.
10. Verify the Agent appears in Agent Management and checks in successfully.
11. Delete the downloaded ZIP and extracted setup directory.

Do not place enrollment.json, enrollment tokens, Agent secrets, or API3
credentials in screenshots, chat, tickets, logs, or source control.

### Existing Agent upgrade

An existing legacy Agent must receive a per-Agent credential before the global
shared-secret compatibility path can be retired for its identity. In Agent
Management, use **Upgrade credential** on that Agent. Download the resulting
Windows package, transfer it only to that Agent computer, and run:

       .\Upgrade-MinerOpsAgentCredential.ps1

The authorization is bound server-side to the existing Agent ID and its
current Site and Agent Zone. The script validates the local Agent ID, upgrades
the canonical runtime, stops the main Agent task, generates the permanent
secret locally, and recoverably replaces only the credential and durable routing
fields in `agent-config.json` using protected same-directory pending and prior
names. Existing API3 credentials, polling settings,
network ranges, state, logs, and backups are preserved. Before any secret is
written, the script creates and verifies a protected recovery file containing
the original Scheduled Task state, exact transition token, and exact locally
generated credential. The Hub accepts an ambiguous retry only for that same
token and credential.

The Agent directory is a filesystem security boundary. The transition rejects
junctions/reparse points, verifies trusted ancestors, denies standard users
create/delete/rename rights, and revalidates the boundary before each rename.
If an existing Agent directory is discovered insecure, the script first writes
`C:\MinerOpsAgent.minerops-filesystem-trust.blocked-<random>.state` under the trusted
parent, then hardens the directory only to contain the incident. The blocker is
outside the contaminated namespace because changing a DACL does not revoke
file or directory handles opened before repair. The same process never redeems
a token, creates or activates a permanent credential, runs the installer, or
removes that blocker. Ordinary second, third, and later invocations remain
blocked even when every current ACL looks correct.

Recovery, pending, replacement remnants, and late-arriving artifacts are
non-authoritative while the external blocker exists. Known transition state is
quarantined without parsing. A correct filename, syntax, or ACL cannot promote
it on a later run. Invalidate any possibly exposed authorization and retain or
remove evidence only under the approved incident procedure.

### Filesystem trust-epoch recovery

Use this procedure only after confirming the blocker was created by the
containment event and preserving required evidence:

1. Do not delete or edit the external blocker. Do not run an ordinary retry.
2. Use **Restart** to perform a full Windows kernel boot. Shutdown with Fast
   Startup is not sufficient: Microsoft documents Fast Startup as hibernating
   and restoring kernel session 0. The script identifies the kernel epoch by
   the Event Log record anchor of the newest
   `Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Boot` event 27 whose `BootType` is exactly `0`.
   Provider, event ID, record ID, and supported event version come from typed
   EventRecord properties; namespace-aware XML selection reads only the
   `BootType` payload. The new full-boot record ID must be strictly greater
   than the stored record ID. Equality, an older/restored record, log clearing
   or numbering reset, missing history, duplication, malformed XML, and an
   unsupported provider schema all fail closed and require safe operator
   intervention. There is no timestamp fallback. The anchor is unchanged by
   clock or timezone changes, sleep, hibernation, and Fast Startup. See
   Microsoft's [system power-state documentation](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/power/system-power-states)
   and [Fast Startup support guidance](https://learn.microsoft.com/troubleshoot/windows-client/setup-upgrade-and-drivers/fast-startup-causes-system-hibernation-shutdown-fail).
3. For a credential transition, use a fresh transition package if any recovery,
   pending, remnant, quarantine, or internal blocker existed. Remove those
   artifacts only under the approved incident procedure after invalidating the
   old authorization.
4. From the reviewed package, run:

       .\Upgrade-MinerOpsAgentCredential.ps1 `
           -ApproveFilesystemTrustResetAfterReboot

   The script verifies that Windows boot identity changed, rescans the protected
   namespace, positively verifies and stops the expected Scheduled Task, and asks the
   installer to replace managed runtime without backing up or restoring any
   pre-reset runtime. The installer leaves both the Agent task and external
   blocker untouched after publication; it has no blocker-deletion path. Before
   its first fallible stop/install step, the parent durably records the strictly
   validated original task intent as `reset-authorized`; after installer
   success it advances the blocker to `runtime-published`. It then verifies the
   config against the package/server identity, commits the credential, and
   restores the recorded task intent. Only the parent removes the blocker,
   after active config and final task state have both been positively verified
   and non-recovery transition cleanup has succeeded. Protected recovery stays
   until after blocker deletion so an interrupted final cleanup remains safe.
5. For a genuinely new enrollment, preserve evidence and use the approved
   protected-recreation incident procedure to remove the contaminated namespace
   and its external blocker, then let `Enroll-MinerOpsAgent.ps1` stage a new
   protected directory. Enrollment has no in-script blocker-deletion path; its
   explicit compatibility switch cannot override a retained blocker.

The explicit switch without a strictly newer canonical full-kernel-boot anchor
fails.
Any suspicious transition artifact, failed runtime publication, failed
credential convergence, invalid final task, or interrupted cleanup retains the
blocker. Runtime publication alone never authorizes deletion. Protected
directory recreation is the alternative when the retained namespace cannot be
verified.

If the script is interrupted after the Hub commits, rerun the same extracted
package without deleting or editing `agent-credential-transition.recovery.json`
or `agent-config.json.pending`. A protected, matching pending config is resumed;
an insecure, malformed, or mismatched artifact fails closed. The original task
intent is durable: an Agent which was running before the first attempt ends
running, while an intentionally stopped Agent remains stopped. Success is not
reported and transition artifacts are not removed until both the active config
and expected final task state are verified. The verifier requires exactly one
enabled root `MinerOpsAgent` task, the SYSTEM service-account/highest principal,
the installed Windows PowerShell action and service-script arguments, and an
exact final state of `Running` for running intent or `Ready` for stopped intent.
Missing, query failure, access denied, malformed, multiple, disabled, queued,
unknown, wrong-action, and wrong-principal results all fail closed and retain
recovery.

After a successful transition, the existing Agent ID, Site, and Zone are
unchanged. Explicit Agent ID plus the new per-Agent secret is required, and the
legacy shared secret is permanently disabled for that identity.

For later code-only upgrades of an Agent that already has a per-Agent
credential, copy the new canonical Agent files to a temporary directory and run
install.ps1 from an elevated Windows PowerShell session.

The installer copies only managed runtime code to C:\MinerOpsAgent and
preserves agent-config.json, agent-state.json, logs\, backups, probe output,
and other runtime data. Existing Scheduled Task definitions are authoritative
and are not rewritten. Missing tasks are created for a fresh or incomplete
installation without hard-coded user names.

If MinerOpsAgent was running before an upgrade, the installer stops only that
Scheduled Task, waits for it to stop, replaces the managed files, and starts it
again. A previously stopped Agent remains stopped. Before replacing runtime
files, the installer copies them to a timestamped backup under
C:\MinerOpsAgent\backups.

Runtime sources, installed destinations, active config, and rollback copies are
rejected when they are reparse points or have more than one hard link. A normal
trusted upgrade creates a fresh random backup directory and never adopts an
existing backup destination. During an explicit post-reboot trust reset, old
runtime is never copied into backup or restored; fresh package content replaces
it while the external blocker remains, and the Agent task stays stopped for
credential verification.

A failed deployment restores managed files, removes tasks created by that
failed attempt, and restores the main Agent's prior running state.

uninstall.ps1 unregisters the four MinerOps Scheduled Tasks and removes runtime
code while preserving local configuration, state, logs, and backups.